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A UNIVERSAL DYNAMIC PROGRAM AND REFINED EXISTENCE RESULTS
FOR DECENTRALIZED STOCHASTIC CONTROL
SERDAR YU¨KSEL ∗
Abstract. For sequential stochastic control problems with standard Borel measurement and control action
spaces, we introduce a very general dynamic programming formulation, establish its well-posedness, and provide
new existence results for optimal policies. Our dynamic program builds in part on Witsenhausen’s standard form,
but with a different formulation for the state, action, and transition dynamics. Using recent results on measurability
properties of strategic measures in decentralized control, we obtain a standard Borel controlled Markov model. This
allows for a well-defined dynamic programming recursion through universal measurability properties of the value
functions for each time stage. In addition, new existence results are obtained for optimal policies in decentralized
stochastic control. These state that for a static team with independent measurements, it suffices for the cost function
to be continuous (only) in the actions for the existence of an optimal policy under mild compactness conditions.
These also apply to dynamic teams which admit static reductions with independent measurements through a change
of measure transformation. We show through a counterexample that weaker conditions may not lead to existence of
an optimal team policy. The paper’s existence results generalize those previously reported.
AMS subject classifications. 93E20, 90B99, 49J99
1. Introduction. An increasingly important research area of mathematical and practical
interest is decentralized stochastic control or team theory, which involves multiple decision
makers (DMs) who strive for a common goal but who have access only to local information.
Applications include energy systems, the smart grid, sensor networks, and networked control
systems, among others [59]. Few results are known regarding systematic methods to arrive
at optimal solutions, and there exist problems (such as Witsenhausen’s counterexample [52])
which have defied solution attempts for more than 50 years.
In this paper, we present a very general dynamic programming formulation for decen-
tralized stochastic control, establish the well-posedness of the dynamic program, and through
this program, obtain new existence results which generalize and complement the previously
reported results. Towards developing our results, we provide a new formulation of the state
of a decentralized stochastic or sequential stochastic control system.
It is worth noting that in the theory of commonly studied single DM stochastic control,
there are fewmain techniques which are utilized to establish the existence and structure of op-
timal policies for finite horizon and infinite horizon problems. One such approach is based on
dynamic programming and the corresponding measurable selection criteria, which has been
summarized elaborately in [27, Theorem 3.3.5 and Appendix D] and [28] among many other
references. Another method is based on the properties of strategic measures [47, 40, 20, 23].
These two techniques provide complementary sufficient conditions for existence results. One
could also mention techniques based on empirical measures, which are particularly useful
for infinite horizon problems, for both the average cost as well as discounted cost criteria,
leading to linear programming/convex analytical conditions (e.g., [27, Chp. 6][12]). These
approaches in general crucially require that the information is expanding over time, in the
sense that the σ-field generated by the information available at the decision maker at time n
is a subset of that generated by the information at n+1 and so on. In decentralized stochastic
control, this nestedness condition does not occur in general and hence the classical methods
are not applicable.
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That dynamic programming can be a useful tool for a class of dynamic teams has been
known since 1970s. Clearly, if all the information at any given decision maker is common
knowledge between all decision makers, then the system can be viewed to be a centralized
system and standard dynamic programming is applicable. However, if only some of the sys-
tem variables are common knowledge, the remaining unknowns may or may not lead to a
computationally tractable program generating an optimal solution. A possible approach to-
ward establishing a tractable program is through the construction of a controlled Markov
chain where the controlled Markov state may now live in a larger state space (for example
a space of probability measures) and the actions are elements in possibly function spaces.
This controlled Markov construction may lead to a computation of optimal policies. Such a
dynamic programming approach has been adopted extensively in the literature (see for ex-
ample, [4], [56], [18], [1], [57], [34] and significantly generalized and termed as the common
information approach in [37] and [38]) through the use of a team-policy which uses com-
mon information to generate partial functions for each DM to generate their actions using
local information. This construction requires a common knowledge among decision mak-
ers, which is a unifying assumption in the aforementioned contributions in the literature. We
refer the reader to [59, Chapter 12] for a comprehensive discussion and some applications
of this approach to zero-delay communications and networked control. On the other hand,
the construction to be presented in this paper is applicable to an arbitrary sequential team.
Also along the dynamic programming based approaches, a related series of contributions for
a class of decentralized differential stochastic control systems (in continuous-time) are [15]
[17] and [16], which have established the Bellman (martingale) and dynamic programming
equations to arrive at optimality conditions, as well as existence results. Notably, these results
also establish conditions for the global optimality of person-by-person-optimal policies for a
class of convex problems.
Our paper is very closely related to Witsenhausen’s standard form [51], which entails a
very general approach establishing that any sequential team optimization may admit a dy-
namic programming formulation. However, well-posedness of the dynamic program was not
established in [51] for standard Borel models. We present a detailed analysis and comparison
with the program proposed in our paper in Section 3.1.
It is also worth mentioning related efforts in the stochastic control literature dealing with
systems under partial information, e.g., which include [43, 31]. These provide a dynamic pro-
gramming formulation for a class of stochastic control problems with perfect recall leading
to a generalized form for a Bellman (martingale) optimality principle for a class systems, see
[31, Definition 4.1, Theorem 5.7] (see also [21] for a controlled-Markovian and perfect-recall
setup). The assumption that the information structure is classical (due to the perfect-recall
property, see Section 3.1) in these papers allows for explicit optimality equations for each
sample path.
With regard to the strategic measures approach, for classical stochastic control problems
such measures were defined (see [47], [40], [20] and [23]) as the set of probability measures
induced on the product (sequence) spaces of the state and action pairs by measurable con-
trol policies: Given an initial distribution on the state, and a policy, one can uniquely define
a probability measure on the product space. Certain measurability, compactness and con-
vexity properties of strategic measures for single decision maker problems were studied in
[20, 40, 23, 10]. In [61] strategic measures for decentralized stochastic control were studied
and many of their properties were established. For decentralized stochastic control problems,
considering the set of strategic measures and compactification or convexification of these sets
of measures through introducing private or common randomness allow for placing a useful
topology, that of weak convergence of probability measures, on the strategy spaces. Com-
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bined with a compactness condition, this allowed for establishing the existence of optimal
team policies in [61], where compactness, convexity and Borel measurability properties were
established, which will be utilized later in the paper. It was shown in particular that, strategic
measures for decentralized stochastic control can behave drastically different when compared
with classical stochastic control problems. In addition to [61], in [26] existence of optimal
policies for static and a class of sequential dynamic teams have been studied, where condi-
tions on the weak compactness of the sets of strategic measures were established. We provide
a literature review on existence results in Section 5.
Contributions. In view of the review above, the paper makes two main contributions.
(i) For sequential stochastic control problems with standard Borel measurement and
control action spaces, we introduce a dynamic programming formulation which is
universally applicable, establish its well-posedness, and provide existence results for
optimal policies. Our dynamic program builds in part on Witsenhausen’s standard
form, but with a very different formulation for the state, action, and transition dy-
namics. We show that the dynamic program is well-posed: Using recent results on
measurability properties of strategic measures in decentralized control, we obtain a
controlled Markov model with standard Borel state and state dependent action sets.
This allows for well-defined dynamic programming recursions through universal
measurability properties of the value functions for each time stage.
(ii) We present existence results which significantly generalize those previously reported
in the literature: These state that for a static team with independent measurements, it
suffices for the cost function to be continuous (only) in the actions for the existence
of an optimal policy under mild compactness conditions. These also apply to dy-
namic teams which admit static reductions with independent measurements through
a change of measure transformation. Since continuity (only) in the actions cannot
be in general relaxed, the existence condition cannot in general be made weaker. In
particular, Theorems 5.5, 5.6 and Theorem 5.2 are the most general existence re-
sults, to our knowledge, for sequential team problems, as we elaborate on later in
the paper.
2. Supporting Results.
2.1. Sequential dynamic teams andWitsenhausen’s characterization of information
structures. Witsenhausen’s contributions (e.g., [53, 54, 51]) to dynamic teams and charac-
terization of information structures have been crucial in our understanding of dynamic teams.
In this section, we introduce the characterizations as laid out by Witsenhausen, termed as
the Intrinsic Model [53]; see [59] for a more comprehensive overview and further charac-
terizations and classifications of information structures. In this model (described in discrete
time), any action applied at any given time is regarded as applied by an individual decision
maker/agent, who acts only once. One advantage of this model, in addition to its generality,
is that the characterizations regarding information structures can be compactly described.
Suppose that in the decentralized system considered below, there is a pre-defined order in
which the decision makers act. Such systems are called sequential systems (for non-sequential
teams, we refer the reader to Andersland and Teneketzis [2], [3] and Teneketzis [49], in
addition to Witsenhausen [50] and [59, p. 113]). Suppose that in the following, the action
and measurement spaces are standard Borel spaces, that is, Borel subsets of Polish (complete,
separable and metric) spaces. In the context of a sequential system, the Intrinsic Model has
the following components:
• A collection of measurable spaces {(Ω,F), (Ui,U i), (Yi,Yi), i ∈ N}, with N :=
{1, 2, · · · , N}, specifying the system’s distinguishable events, and the control and
measurement spaces. Here N = |N | is the number of control actions taken, and
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each of these actions is taken by an individual (different) DM (hence, even a DM
with perfect recall can be regarded as a separate decision maker every time it acts).
The pair (Ω,F) is a measurable space (on which an underlying probability may be
defined). The pair (Ui,U i) denotes the measurable space from which the action, ui,
of decision maker i is selected. The pair (Yi,Yi) denotes the measurable observa-
tion/measurement space for DM i.
• A measurement constraint which establishes the connection between the observa-
tion variables and the system’s distinguishable events. The Yi-valued observation
variables are given by yi = ηi(ω,u[1,i−1]), u[1,i−1] = {uk, k ≤ i− 1}, ηi measur-
able functions and uk denotes the action of DM k. Hence, the information variable
yi induces a σ-field, σ(Ii) over Ω×
∏i−1
k=1U
k
• A design constraint which restricts the set of admissible N -tuple control laws γ =
{γ1, γ2, . . . , γN}, also called designs or policies, to the set of all measurable control
functions, so that ui = γi(yi), with yi = ηi(ω,u[1,i−1]), and γi, ηi measurable
functions. Let Γi denote the set of all admissible policies for DM i and let Γ =∏
k Γ
k.
We note that, the intrinsic model of Witsenhausen gives a set-theoretic characterization
of information fields, however, for standard Borel spaces, the model above is equivalent to
that of Witsenhausen’s.
One can also introduce a fourth component [59]:
• A probability measure P defined on (Ω,F) which describes the measures on the
random events in the model.
Under this intrinsic model, a sequential team problem is dynamic if the information avail-
able to at least one DM is affected by the action of at least one other DM. A decentralized
problem is static, if the information available at every decision maker is only affected by ex-
ogenous disturbances (Nature); that is no other decision maker can affect the information at
any given decision maker.
Information structures can also be classified as classical, quasi-classical or nonclassical.
An Information Structure (IS) {yi, 1 ≤ i ≤ N} is classical if yi contains all of the informa-
tion available to DM k for k < i. An IS is quasi-classical or partially nested, if whenever
uk, for some k < i, affects yi through the measurement function ηi, yi contains yk (that is
σ(yk) ⊂ σ(yi)). An IS which is not partially nested is nonclassical.
Let
γ = {γ1, · · · , γN}
and let a cost function be defined as:
J(γ) = E[c(ω0,u)] = E[c(ω0, γ
1(y1), · · · , γN(yN ))], (2.1)
for some non-negative measurable loss (or cost) function c : Ω0 ×
∏
k U
k → R+. Here,
we have the notation u = {ut, t ∈ N}, and ω0 may be viewed as the cost function relevant
exogenous variable contained in ω.
DEFINITION 2.1. For a given stochastic team problem with a given information struc-
ture, {J ; Γi, i ∈ N}, a policy (strategy) N -tuple γ∗ := (γ1
∗
, . . . , γN
∗
) ∈ Γ is an optimal
team decision rule (team-optimal decision rule or simply team-optimal solution) if
J(γ∗) = inf
γ∈Γ
J(γ) =: J∗. (2.2)
The expected cost achieved by this strategy, J∗, is the optimal team cost.
In the following, we will denote by bold letters the ensemble of random variables across
the DMs; that is y = {yi, i = 1, · · · , N} and u = {ui, i = 1, · · · , N}.
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2.2. Independent-measurements reduction of sequential teams under a new prob-
ability measure. Following Witsenhausen [54, Eqn (4.2)], as reviewed in [59, Section 3.7],
we say that two information structures are equivalent if: (i) The policy spaces are equiva-
lent/isomorphic in the sense that policies under one information structure are realizable under
the other information structure, (ii) the costs achieved under equivalent policies are identical
almost surely, and (iii) if there are constraints in the admissible policies, the isomorphism
among the policy spaces preserves the constraint conditions.
A large class of sequential team problems admit an equivalent information structure
which is static. This is called the static reduction of a dynamic team problem. For the
analysis of our paper, we need to go beyond a static reduction, and we will need to make the
measurements independent of each other as well as ω0. This is not possible for every team
which admits a static reduction, for example quasi-classical team problems with LQG mod-
els [30] do not admit such a further reduction, since the measurements are partially nested.
Witsenhausen refers to such an information structure as independent static in [54, Section
4.2(e)].
Consider now (a static or a dynamic) team setting according to the intrinsic model where
each DM t measures yt = gt(ω0, ωt, y
1, . . . , yt−1, u1, . . . , ut−1), and the decisions are gen-
erated by ut = γt(yt), with 1 ≤ t ≤ N . Here ω0, ω1, · · · , ωN are primitive (exogenous)
variables. We will indeed, for every 1 ≤ n ≤ N , view the relation
P (dyn|ω0, y
1, y2, · · · , yn−1, u1, u2, · · · , un−1),
as a (controlled) stochastic kernel (to be defined later), and through standard stochastic re-
alization results (see [25, Lemma 1.2] or [13, Lemma 3.1]), we can represent this kernel in
a functional form through yn = gn(ω0, ωn, y
1, y2, · · · , yn−1, u1, u2, · · · , un−1) for some
independent ωn and measurable gn.
This team admits an independent-measurements reduction provided that the following
absolute continuity condition holds: For every t ∈ N , there exists a reference probability
measureQt and a function ft such that for all Borel S:
P (yt ∈ S|ω0, u
1, u2, · · · , ut−1, y1, y2, · · · , yt−1)
=
∫
S
ft(y
t, ω0, u
1, u2, · · · , ut−1, y1, y2, · · · , yt−1)Qt(dy
t), (2.3)
We can then write (since the action of each DM is determined by the measurement vari-
ables under a policy)
P (dω0, dy, du)
= P (dω0)
N∏
t=1
(
ft(y
t, ω0, u
1, u2, · · · , ut−1, y1, y2, · · · , yt−1)Qt(dy
t)1{γt(yt)∈dut}
)
.
The cost function J(γ) can then be written as
J(γ) =
∫
P (dω0)
N∏
t=1
(ft(y
t, ω0, u
1, u2, · · · , ut−1, y1, y2, · · · , yt−1)Qt(dy
t))c(ω0,u),
with uk = γk(yk) for 1 ≤ k ≤ N , and where now the measurement variables can be regarded
as independent from each other, and also from ω0, and by incorporating the {ft} terms into c,
we can obtain an equivalent static team problem. Hence, the essential step is to appropriately
adjust the probability space and the cost function.
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The new cost function may now explicitly depend on the measurement values, such that
cs(ω0,y,u) = c(ω0,u)
N∏
t=1
ft(y
t, ω0, u
1, u2, · · · , ut−1, y1, y2, · · · , yt−1). (2.4)
Here we can reformulate even a static team to one which is, clearly still static, but now
with independentmeasurements which are also independent from the cost relevant exogenous
variable ω0. Such a condition is not very restrictive; Witsenhausen’s counterexample, to be
reviewed later below in Section 5.4.1, as well as the conditions required in [26] satisfy this.
We note that Witsenhausen, in [54, Eqn (4.2)], considered a standard Borel setup; as Wit-
senhausen notes, a static reduction always holds when the measurement variables take values
from countable set since a reference measure as in Qt above can be constructed on the mea-
surement variable yt (e.g., Qt(y
t) =
∑
i≥1 2
−i1{yt=mi} where Y
t = {mi, i ∈ N}) so that
the absolute continuity condition always holds. On the other hand independent-measurements
reduction does not always hold for countable measurement spaces. We refer the reader to
[15] for further findings, sufficiency conditions, and relations with classical continuous-time
stochastic control where the relation with Girsanov’s classical measure transformation is rec-
ognized, and [59, p. 114] for further discussion.
2.3. The strategic measures approach and a review of some related results. In [61],
strategic measures for decentralized stochastic control were studied. In this section, we re-
view some of the results in [61] that will be relevant in the dynamic programming approach
to be presented in the following section.
For single-DM stochastic control problems, strategic measures are defined (see [47],
[40], [20] and [23]) as the set of probability measures induced on the sequence spaces of the
state and action pairs by measurable control policies. In [61], through such a strategic mea-
sures formulation, existence, convexity and Borel measurability properties were established
for decentralized stochastic control. It was shown in particular that, strategic measures for de-
centralized stochastic control can behave drastically different when compared with classical
stochastic control problems.
2.3.1. Sets of strategic measures for static teams. Consider a static team problem
defined underWitsenhausen’s intrinsic model in Section 2.1. LetLA(µ) be the set of strategic
measures induced by all admissible team policies with (ω0,y) ∼ µ. In the following, B =
B0 ×
∏
k(A
k ×Bk) are used to denote the Borel sets in Ω0 ×
∏
k(Y
k × Uk),
LA(µ) :=
{
P ∈ P
(
Ω0 ×
N∏
k=1
(Yk × Uk)
)
:
P (B) =
∫
B0×
∏
k
Ak
µ(dω0, dy)
∏
k
1{uk=γk(yk)∈Bk}, γ
k ∈ Γk, B ∈ B(Ω0 ×
∏
k
(Yk × Uk))
}
Let LA(µ, γ) be the strategic measure induced by a particular γ ∈ Γ.
Let LR(µ) be the set of strategic measures induced by all admissible team policies where
ω0,y ∼ µ and policies are individually randomized (that is, with independent randomiza-
tions):
LR(µ) :=
{
P ∈ P
(
Ω0 ×
N∏
k=1
(Yk × Uk)
)
: P (B) =
∫
B
µ(dω0, dy)
∏
k
Πk(duk|yk)
}
where Πk takes place from the set of stochastic kernels from Yk to Uk for each k.
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2.3.2. Sets of strategic measures for dynamic teams. We present the following char-
acterization for strategic measures in dynamic sequential teams. Let for all n ∈ N ,
hn = {ω0, y
1, u1, · · · , yn−1, un−1, yn, un},
and pn(dy
n|hn−1) := P (dyn|hn−1) be the transition kernel characterizing themeasurements
of DM n according to the intrinsic model. We note that this may be obtained by the relation:
pn(y
n ∈ ·|ω0, y
1, u1, · · · , yn−1, un−1)
:= P
(
ηn(ω, u1, · · · , un−1) ∈ ·
∣∣∣∣ω0, y1, u1, · · · , yn−1, un−1
)
(2.5)
Let LA(µ) be the set of strategic measures induced by deterministic policies and let
LR(µ) be the set of strategic measures induced by randomized policies. We note as earlier
that such an individual randomized policy can be represented in a functional form: By Lemma
1.2 in Gikhman and Shorodhod [25] and Theorem 1 in Feinberg [22], for any stochastic kernel
Πk from Yk to Uk, there exists a measurable function γk : [0, 1]× Yk → Uk such that
m{r : γk(r, yk) ∈ A} = Πk(uk ∈ A|yk), (2.6)
andm is the uniform distribution (Lebesgue measure) on [0, 1].
THEOREM 2.2. [61, Theorem 2.2]
(i) A probability measure P ∈ P
(
Ω0 ×
∏N
k=1(Y
k × Uk)
)
is a strategic measure
induced by a deterministic policy (that is in LA(µ)) if and only if for every n ∈
{1, · · · , N}:∫
P (dhn−1, dy
n)g(hn−1, y
n) =
∫
P (dhn−1)
(∫
Yn
g(hn−1, z)pn(dz|hn−1)
)
,
and∫
P (dhn)g(hn−1, y
n, un) =
∫
P (dhn−1, dy
n)
(∫
Un
g(hn−1, y
n, a)1{γn(yn)∈da}
)
,
for some γn ∈ Γn, for all continuous and bounded g, with P (dω0) = µ(dw0).
(ii) A probability measure P ∈ P
(
Ω0 ×
∏N
k=1(Y
k × Uk)
)
is a strategic measure
induced by a randomized policy (that is in LR(µ)) if and only if for every n ∈
{1, · · · , N}:∫
P (dhn−1, dy
n)g(hn−1, y
n) =
∫
P (dhn−1)
(∫
Yn
g(hn−1, z)pn(dz|hn−1)
)
,
(2.7)
and∫
P (dhn)g(hn−1, y
n, un) =
∫
P (dhn−1, dy
n)
(∫
Un
g(hn−1, y
n, an)Πn(dan|yn)
)
,
(2.8)
for some stochastic kernel Πn on Un given Yn, for all continuous and bounded g,
with P (dω0) = µ(dw0).
The above will be useful for defining states in decentralized stochastic control in the next
section.
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2.3.3. Measurability properties of sets of strategic measures. We have the following
result, which will be crucial in the analysis to follow.
THEOREM 2.3. [61, Theorem 2.10] Consider a sequential (static or dynamic) team.
(i) The set of strategic measures LR(µ) is Borel when viewed as a subset of the space
of probability measures on Ω0 ×
∏
k(Y
k × Uk) under weak convergence.
(ii) The set of strategic measures LA(µ) is Borel when viewed as a subset of the space
of probability measures on Ω0 ×
∏
k(Y
k × Uk) under weak convergence.
For further properties of the sets of strategic measures, see [61].
3. ControlledMarkovModel Formulation for Decentralized Stochastic Control and
Well-Posedness of a Dynamic Program.
3.1. Dynamic programming through Witsenhausen’s standard form [51]. Witsen-
hausen’s standard form proceeds as follows, in the formulation of our paper.
(i) State: xt = {ω, u1, . . . , ut−1}, 1 ≤ t ≤ N .
(i’) Extended State: For every Borel B ∈ Ω×
∏t−1
i=1 U
i,
πt(B) = Epit [1{(ω,u1,...,ut−1)∈B}].
(ii) Action: γt is σ(yt)-measurable; 1 ≤ t ≤ N .
(iii) Cost: E[c(ω, u1, . . . , uN)].
(iv) Transition Dynamics/Kernel:
xt = gt(xt−1; γ
t−1(xt−1)).
As defined above, πt is P(Ω×
∏t−1
i=1 U
i)-valued. Let us endow this space of probability
measures endowed with the total variation norm. If one views the set of such probability mea-
sures as a subset of the set of all signed countably additive finite measures one could consider
a duality pairing under the weak∗-topology [19, Section 4.6] (which would correspond to the
classical weak convergence topology commonly studied in probability theory if the state and
the measurement spaces were compact [36]). However, even in the absence of such compact-
ness conditions, with Ψt being the set of bounded continuous functionals on Ω ×
∏t
i=1 U
i,
ψt−1 ∈ Ψt−1 defines a linear and continuous (bounded) map on the linear space of signed
measures, where P(Ω×
∏t−1
i=1 U
i) is viewed as a subset, through the relation
〈ψt−1, πt〉 :=
∫
πt(dω, du
1, . . . , dut−1)ψt−1(ω, u
1, . . . , ut−1).
Here, ψt can be viewed as a co-state variable defined by the relation
〈ψt, Tt(γ
t)πt〉 = 〈T
∗
t (γ
t)ψt, πt〉 (3.1)
with Tt(γ
t) : P(Ω×
∏t−1
i=1 U
i)→ P(Ω×
∏t
i=1 U
i) defined by
πt+1(E) = [Tt(γ
t)(πt)](E) = πt
(
{xt : gt(xt; γ
t) ∈ E}
)
and T ∗t : Ψt → Ψt−1 is adjoint to Tt defined through (3.1):
[T ∗t (γ
t)](ψt) = ψt−1, (3.2)
with the terminal condition
ψN = c(ω, u
1, · · · , uN),
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and the (expected) cost induced by a team policy being
〈ψN , TN(γ
N )πN 〉.
Given the above, Witsenhausen states the following:
THEOREM 3.1. [51, Thm. 1] If a team policy γ∗ = {γ1,∗, · · · , γN,∗} is optimal, then
for all 1 ≤ t ≤ N ,
J(γ∗) = min
γt
〈ψ∗t , Tt(γ
t)πt〉 (3.3)
where ψ∗t is obtained inductively, as a dynamic program, through (3.2) with γ
t taken to be
γt,∗.
Proof. Write
πt = Tt−1(γ
t−1)oTt−2(γ
t−2)o . . . oT1(γ
1)π0
Here, πt does not depend on γ
t, γt+1, . . . , γN . Likewise,
ψt = T
∗
t+1(γ
t+1)oT ∗t+2(γ
t+2)o . . . oT ∗N (γ
N)ψN .
Thus, ψt does not depend on γ
1, . . . , γt. Through dynamic programming similar to Bellman’s
principle, first for t = N , for any γt,
〈ψt, Tt(γ
t,∗)πt〉 = 〈T
∗
t (γ
t,∗)ψt, πt〉 ≤ 〈ψt, Tt(γ
t)πt〉,
and with ψ∗t−1 = T
∗
t (γ
t,∗)ψt, and dynamics πt = Tt−1(γ
t,∗−1)πt−1, we have that for 1 ≤
t ≤ N − 1, for an optimal policy γt,∗ the following holds,
〈ψ∗t−1, Tt−1(γ
t−1,∗)πt−1〉 ≤ 〈ψ
∗
t−1, Tt−1(γ
t−1)πt−1〉.
By induction, the optimal cost is equal to
〈ψ∗1 , T1(γ
1,∗)π1〉.
Witsenhausen [51] does not address the well-posedness of a dynamic program (3.3),
that is, whether the recursions presented in Theorem 3.1 are well-defined. Furthermore, the
existence problem was not considered in [51]. These are the main motivations behind the
construction in the following.
3.2. A new dynamic programming formulation through a standard Borel state and
action space construction. We introduce a modification based on the strategic measures
formulation studied in [61], which will be utilized further below. This formulation allows for
the recursions to be written more explicitly and will lead to desirable measurability properties.
We split ω into ω0 and the rest (recall that ω represents the entire exogenous uncertainty
acting on the system, including the initial state, the system and measurement noise): ω0 is
the smallest variable whose sigma-field generated over Ω, together with those generated by
u1, . . . , uN on their respective action spaces, c is measurable on. Such an ω0 is typically
explicitly given in a team problem formulation.
(i) State: xt = {ω0, u1, · · · , ut−1, y1, · · · , yt}, 1 ≤ t ≤ N .
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(i’) Extended State: πt ∈ P(Ω0 ×
∏t
i=1 Y
i ×
∏t−1
i=1 U
i) where, for Borel B ∈ Ω0 ×∏t
i=1 Y
i ×
∏t−1
i=1 U
i,
πt(B) := Epit [1{(ω0,y1,··· ,yt;u1,··· ,ut−1)∈B}].
Thus, πt ∈ P(Ω0 ×
∏t
i=1 Y
i ×
∏t−1
i=1 U
i) where the space of probability measures
is endowed with the weak convergence topology.
(ii) Action: Given πt, γˆ
t is a probability measure in P(Ω0×
∏t
k=1Y
k×
∏t
k=1 U
k) that
satisfies the conditional independence relation:
ut ↔ yt ↔ (ω0, y
1, · · · , yt;u1, · · · , ut−1)
(that is, for every Borel B ∈ Ui, almost surely under γˆt, the following holds:
P (ut ∈ B|yt, (ω0, y
1, · · · , yt;u1, · · · , ut−1) = P (ut ∈ B|yt)
with the restriction
xt ∼ πt,
where πt represents the restriction on the joint measure.
Denote with Γt(πt) the set of all such probability measures. Any γˆ
t ∈ Γt(πt)
defines, for almost every realization yt, a conditional probability measure on Ut.
When the notation does not lead to confusion, we will denote the action at time t by
γt(dut|yt), which is understood to be consistent with γˆt.
(ii’) Alternative Action for Static Teams: Given πt, γˆ
t is a probability measure onYt×Ut
with a fixed marginal P (dyt) on Yt, that is πY
t
t (dy
t) = P (dyt). Denote with
Γt(πY
t
t ) the set of all such probability measures. As above, when the notation does
not lead to confusion, we will denote the action at time t by γt(dut|yt), which is
understood to be consistent with γˆt.
(iiii) Cost: E[c(ω0, u
1, . . . , uN )] =: 〈c, γˆN(πN )〉, with:
(
γˆN (πN )
)
(B) := EγˆN (piN )[1{(ω0,y1,··· ,yN ;u1,··· ,ut−1,uN )∈B}],
for 1 ≤ t ≤ N .
(iv) Transition Kernel: Tt(γ
t) : P(Ω0 ×
∏t
i=1 Y
i ×
∏t−1
i=1 U
i) → P(Ω0 ×
∏t+1
i=1 Y
i ×∏t
i=1 U
i) so that
πt+1 = Tt(γ
t)(πt),
is defined by
Tt(γ
t)(πt)(A1, A2, A3)
=
∫
xt∈A1
∫
ut∈A2
∫
yt+1∈A3
P (dyt+1|ω0, y
1, · · · , yt;u1, · · · , ut)γt(dut|yt)πt(dxt),
for Borel A1, A2, A3.
Some further differences with Witsenhausen’s standard form are as follows.
(a) InWitsenhausen’s form, a deterministic update equation of the form xt = gt(xt−1; γ
t−1(xt−1))
exists, whereas in the formulation here we do not have such a measurable determin-
istic map, for ω is not part of the state. Furthermore, γt is allowed to be randomized.
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(b) Although it will not be used in our analysis (we will apply a standard Bellman op-
timality argument with the aforementioned construction), to be consistent with Wit-
senhausen’s formulation, we can also define ψt (as a measurable functional from
Ω0×
∏t
k=1 Y
k+1×
∏t
k=1 U
k to R) as a co-state variable: With the transition kernel
given as (3.4), we can define the recursions and the adjoint variable ψt iteratively
with
〈ψt, Tt(γ
t)πt〉 = 〈T
∗
t (γ
t)ψt, πt〉 (3.4)
where T ∗t (γ
t) : Ψt → Ψt−1 is adjoint to Tt defined through (3.4) -a more explicit
representation will be presented further below using the properties of conditional
expectation-, and
ψN (ω0, y
1, . . . , yN , u1, . . . , uN ) := c(ω0, u
1, . . . , uN ).
(c) Unlike Witsenhausen who endows the set of probability measures with total varia-
tion, we endow the set with the weak convergence topology. This we do to obtain
a standard Borel space: total variation does not lead to a space of probability mea-
sures which is separable, whereas the space of probability measures on a complete,
separable, metric (Polish) space endowed with the topology of weak convergence is
itself a complete, separable, metric space [8]. The Prokhorov metric, for example,
can be used to metrize this space.
In the proposed formulation, an explicit representation would be the following.
EXAMPLE 1 (Explicit representation as a terminal time problem).
〈ψt−1, T (γ
t−1)πt−1〉
=
∫
πt−1(dω0, dy
1, . . . , yt−1, du1, . . . , dut−2)
×E
[
c
(
ω0, u
1, . . . , ut−2, γt−1(yt−1), γt(Y t), · · · , γN (Y N )
)∣∣∣∣ω0, u1, · · · , ut−2, y1, · · · , yt−1
]
Here, {Y i} variables are displayed with capital letters to highlight that these are random
given ω0, unlike what a corresponding expression would look like under Witsenhausen’s for-
mulation when they would be deterministic given ω.
The following result is immediate by construction, through a standard Bellman optimal-
ity argument.
THEOREM 3.2. If a team policy γ∗ = {γ1,∗, · · · , γN,∗} is optimal, then for all 1 ≤ t ≤
N ,
J(γ∗) = inf
γt
〈ψ∗t , Tt(γ
t)πt〉 (3.5)
where ψ∗t is obtained inductively through (3.4) with γ
t taken to be γt,∗. Furthermore, any
team policy which satisfies (3.5) together with (3.4), is optimal.
3.2.1. Well-posedness of the proposed dynamic program in Theorem 3.2. Witsen-
hausen does not address the well-posedness of a dynamic programming equation leading to
the recursions given in (3.3), but notes that for teams with finite action and measurement
spaces the equations would be well-defined. For the more general setup, as we will observe
in the following, the well-posedness of the dynamic programming recursions requires us to
revisit the concepts of universal measurability and analytic functions.
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A function f is µ-measurable if there exists a Borel measurable function g which agrees
with f µ-a.e. A function that is µ-measurable for every probability measure µ is called uni-
versally measurable. A set B is universally measurable if the function 1{x∈B} is universally
measurable.
Ameasurable image of a Borel set is called an analytic set [20, Appendix 2]. We note that
this is evidently equivalent to the seemingly more restrictive condition of being a continuous
image of some Borel set.
Fact 3.1. The image of a Borel set under a measurable function, and hence an analytic
set, is universally measurable.
The integral of a universally measurable function is well-defined and is equal to the
integral of a Borel measurable function which is µ-almost equal to that function (with µ
being the measure for integration).
While applying dynamic programming, we often seek to establish the existence of mea-
surable functions through the operation:
Jt(xt) = inf
u∈U(xt)
(
c(xt, u) +
∫
Jt+1(xt+1)Q(dxt+1|xt, u)
)
However, we need a stronger condition than universal measurability for the recursions to be
well-defined.
A function f is called lower semi-analytic if {x : f(x) < c} is analytic for each scalar
c ∈ R. Lower semi-analytic functions are universally measurable [20].
THEOREM 3.3. [20] Let i : S → X and f : S → R be Borel measurable functions.
Then,
v(x) = inf
{z:i(z)=x}
f(z)
is lower semi-analytic.
Observe that (see p. 85 of [20])
i−1({x : v(x) < c}) = {z : f(z) < c}
The set {z : f(z) < c} is Borel, and thus if i is also Borel, it follows that v is lower semi-
analytic. An application of this result leads to the following.
THEOREM 3.4. ConsiderG = {(x, u) : u ∈ U(x) ⊂ U} a measurable subset of X×U.
Let v : X× U→ R be Borel measurable. Then, the map
κ(x) := inf
(x,u)∈G
v(x, u),
is lower semi-analytic (and thus universally measurable).
The proof follows from the fact that i−1({x : κ(x) < c}) = {(x, z) : v(x, z) < c},
where i is the projection ofG onto X, which is a continuous operation; the image may not be
measurable but as a measurable mapping of a Borel set, it is analytic and thus the function v
is lower semi-analytic and thus universally measurable.
The feasibility of dynamic programming follows: The result below is due to [7, Theo-
rems 7.47 and 7.48]:
THEOREM 3.5. Let E1, E2 be Borel sets, and let for every x ∈ E1, E2(x) be a subset of
E2 such that the set {(x, u) : x ∈ E1, u ∈ E2(x)} is a Borel set in E1 × E2.
(i) Let g : E1 × E2 → R be lower semi-analytic. Then,
h(e1) = inf
e2∈E2(e1)
g(e1, e2)
is lower semi-analytic.
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(ii) Let g : E1 ×E2 → R be lower semi-analytic. Let Q(de2|e1) be a stochastic kernel.
Then,
f(e1) :=
∫
g(e1, e2)Q(de2|e1)
is lower semi-analytic.
Now, by Theorem 2.3, the Borel measurability properties of LR(µ) is useful in establish-
ing the universal measurability and the lower semi-analytic properties of the value functions:
Define
J∗(µ) = inf
P∈LR(µ)
∫
P (ds)c(s)
Building on the Borel measurability result for LR(µ), and following steps similar to Dynkin
and Yushkevich [20] and Lemma 4.1 of Feinberg [23] for single decision maker problems, the
universal measurability of J∗ can be established. As noted above, this is useful when Borel
measurability of J∗ cannot be established, yet algorithms such as dynamic programming
can be carried out through the verification of universal measurability properties: It suffices
for a function to be universally measurable (and not necessarily Borel measurable) for its
integration with respect to some probability measure to be well-defined. We refer the reader
to [7, Chapter 7] for a comprehensive discussion on such measurability properties.
We now return to the question of the well-posedness of the dynamic programming for-
mulation introduced in the previous subsection.
THEOREM 3.6. The recursions
Jt(γ
∗) = inf
γˆt∈Γt(pit)
〈ψ∗t , Tt(γˆ
t)πt〉
are well-defined. In particular, the dynamic programming introduced in Theorem 3.2 together
with (3.4) is well-defined.
Proof. Step (i).
We utilize the formulation introduced in Section 3.2 with the standard Borel action set γˆt
and apply backwards induction. Let πN (· · · ) = P (dω0, dy1, · · · , dyN , du1, · · · , duN−1).
Recall that at timeN , we infimize over γˆN which is the set of all probability measures which
satisfies
uN ↔ yN ↔ (ω0, y
1, · · · , yN−1;u1, · · · , uN−1)
This is a Borel set. The infimum will then be universally measurable in πN . Then, through
an application of Theorem 3.5(i), by writing e1 = πN and e2 = γˆ
N , given that e2 is Borel,
h(e1) = inf
e2∈E2
g(e1, e2)
will be lower semi-analytic in πN : observe that e1 is simply the projection of e2.
Step (ii). We observe that the graph
{πt,Γ
t(πt)},
is measurable, that is {(π, γt(π))}, which is the set of all strategic measures that can be
applied for every state and policy pairs is a measurable subset. Note that {(πN , γN(πN ))} is
in fact nothing by LR(µ), which we know to be measurable, and for each 1 ≤ t ≤ N , we
will have the restriction of this measurable set to (Ω0,
∏t
k=1Y
k,
∏t−1
m=1U
m).
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Theorem 3.5(i) thus ensures that
J∗N (πN ) = inf
γN
〈ψ∗N , TN(γ
N )πN 〉
is a lower semi-analytic function
Step (iii). For,
inf
γN−1
〈ψ∗N−1, TN−1(γ
N−1)πN−1〉,
with
ψ∗N−1(xN−1) = E
[
c(ω, u1, . . . , γt−1(yt−1), γN−1(yN−1), γN,∗(Y N ))
∣∣∣∣ω0, y1, . . . , yN , u1, . . . , uN−1
]
(3.6)
we also obtain a lower semi-analytic function. This follows because of the inductive nature
of dynamic programming:
Theorem 3.5(ii) ensures that E[J(πN )|πN−1, γN−1] is lower semi-analytic. Note that
P (dπN |πN−1, γN−1) is a well-defined stochastic kernel.
In particular, through the sequence of recursions
inf
γ1∈Γ1
Eγ
1
[
inf
γ2∈Γ2
Eγ
2
[
· · · inf
γN∈ΓN
Eγ
N
[
c(ω0, u
1, · · · , uN)
]
· · ·
∣∣∣∣y2
∣∣∣∣y1
]
(3.7)
At each iteration, we apply first Theorem 3.5 (i) and then (ii) to ensure the lower semi-
analyticity.
REMARK 1. The infima in (3.7) can be replaced to be over deterministic γn instead of
γˆn due to [61, Theorems 2.3 and 2.5] and [26, p. 1691].
4. Existence of Optimal Policies through the Dynamic Programming Formulation.
Given the dynamic programming formulation, the discussion above leads to the question on
whether the dynamic programming approach can lead to new existence or regularity proper-
ties on optimal policies.
4.1. A counterexample on non-existence under weak continuity and its analysis. In
the following, we revisit an example presented in [59, Chapter 3] on the non-existence of an
optimal policy. The example from [59] has the same cost function and information structure
as Witsenhausen’s original counterexample, but with only discrete distributions. The linear
dynamics are given as follows and the flow of dynamics and information are presented in
Figures 4.1 and 4.2.
y0 = x0, u0 = µ0(y0), x1 = x0 + u0,
y1 = x1 + w1, u1 = µ1(y1), x2 = x1 + u1.
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u1u0
w1
x0
y0
x1 x2
y1µ0 µ1
Fig. 4.1: Witsenhausen’s counterexample.
The goal is to minimize the expected performance index for some k > 0
QW (x0, x1, x2, u0, u1) = k(u0)
2 + x22
Suppose x0 and w1 are two independent, zero-mean Gaussian random variables with
variance σ2 and 1. An equivalent representation is:
u0 = γ0(x), u1 = γ1(u0 + w).
QW (x0, x1, x2, u0, u1) = k(u0 − x)
2 + (u1 − u0)
2 , (4.1)
This is the celebrated counterexample due to Witsenhausen, where he showed that an optimal
policy for such a problem is non-linear: even though the system is linear, the exogenous
variables are Gaussian, and the cost criterion is quadratic: decentralization makes even such
a problem very challenging. We refer the reader to [59, Chapter 3] and [45] for a detailed
historical discussion as well as on the numerical aspects for this very challening problem.
Now, consider the same cost, but with the assumption that x0 = x and w1 are {−1, 1}-
valued independent uniformly distributed random variables.
For this setup, consider for each ǫ > 0 sufficiently small, the construction:
γ0(x) = x+ ǫ sgn(x) γ1(y) =


1 + ǫ, if y = 2 + ǫ or ǫ
−1− ǫ, if y = −2− ǫ or − ǫ
,
and note that the corresponding value of J is kǫ2. This shows that J , can be made arbitrarily
close to zero by picking ǫ sufficiently small.
Thus infimum of J is 0, but this cannot be achieved because in the limit as ǫ → 0, it is
no longer possible to transmit x (and thus u0, which inevitably depends on it to keep the first
term in J small) perfectly. There does not exist an optimal policy!
x
γ0 γ1
y u1u0
w1
Fig. 4.2: Another representation of Witsenhausen’s counterexample which makes the non-
existence result for the discrete setup more evident.
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A formal negative result thus is the following, the proof of which is the counterexample
presented above.
THEOREM 4.1. Consider a dynamic team. Suppose that
E[
∫
f(z)πn+1(dz)|πn, γˆ
n],
is weakly continuous in πn, γˆ
n for every continuous and bounded f . Suppose that all of the
measurement and action spaces and Ω0 are compact and the cost function c is continuous.
Even for such a team, with only two decision makers, an optimal team policy may not exist.
We now go through the arguments to see why continuity/compactness conditions may
not hold under such weak continuity conditions presented in Theorem 4.1.
Let πN (· · · ) = P (dω0, dy1, · · · , dyN , du1, · · · , duN−1). Let γˆN be the joint measure
defined by γN which satisfies the conditional measure. Note that the action space depends
on the state. In particular, through an application of Theorem 3.5(i), by writing e1 = πN and
e2 = γ
N(πN ), given that E2 is Borel,
h(e1) = inf
e2∈E2
g(e1, e2)
will be lower semi-analytic. Through the compactness condition, we know that for every
πN there exists an optimal γ
N . A question is whether γN can be taken to be measurable in
πN . This holds because: γN is compact; its graph is measurable, as a consequence of the
following result:
LEMMA 4.2. [29, Theorem 2], [46] [33] Let c(x, u) be a continuous function on U for
every x, where U is a compact set. Then, there exists a Borel measurable function f : X→ U
such that
c(x, f(x)) = min
u∈U
c(x, u)
The results of Lemma 4.2 also apply when U(x) depends on x so that it is compact for each
x and {(x, u) : u ∈ U(x)} is a Borel subset of X × U, through the following measurable
selection theorem.
LEMMA 4.3. [33] Let X,U Polish spaces and Γ = (x, ψ(x)) where ψ(x) ⊂ U be such
that, ψ(x) is closed for each x ∈ X and Γ be a Borel measurable set in X × U. Then, there
exists at least one measurable function f : X→ U such that {(x, f(x)), x ∈ X} ⊂ Γ.
By this theorem, it follows that γˆN can be measurably selected given πN . Thus, an opti-
mal policy exists for this time stage. Furthermore, JN (πN ) is not only lower semi-analytic,
but is actually Borel measurable.
However, JN (πN ) is not in general continuous and it is this condition which fails for the
counterexample.
A sufficient condition for continuity is the following upper semi-continuity condition for
the set-valued map ΓN (πN ), mapping πN to the set Γ
N (πN ). For some related results see
[27, Appendix D, Proposition D.5]).
LEMMA 4.4. inf γˆN JN (πN , γˆ
N ) is continuous in πN if (i) Γ
N (πN ) is an upper semi-
continuous set-valued function so that if πN,n → πN and γˆN,∗n → γˆ
N,∗ with γˆN,∗n ∈
ΓN (πN,n) then γˆ
N,∗ ∈ ΓN (πN ) and (ii) ∪piN,n→piNΓ
N(πN,n) is pre-compact (that is, tight)
for every sequence πN,n → πN .
For a class of static teams, this condition is applicable as we study more explicitly in the
following.
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4.2. Existence for static teams or static-reducible dynamic teams. In view of the
discussion above, a positive result is the following; this significantly generalizes earlier re-
ported results on existence. This result will be further generalized in Theorem 5.1, but the
proof for the result below will be more direct and accessible. Furthermore, Theorem 4.5 will
lead to a robustness result which shows that the value function of a sequential team problem
may be continuous in the priors. We anticipate this result to have significant applications in
decentralized stochastic control.
Note that for such static teams we modify the control action space Γt at time t (which
for the static case is the set of probability measures on Yt ×Ut with a fixed marginal P (dyt)
on Yt) as discussed in Section 3.2.
THEOREM 4.5. Consider a static or a dynamic team that admits a reduced form with cs
(see (2.4)) continuous. Suppose that all of the action spaces are compact and cs is continuous
and bounded. Then, an optimal team policy exists.
Proof. Step (i). We represent the control action spaces with space of all joint measures
on Yi × Ui with a fixed marginal on yi. Since the team is static, this decouples the action
spaces from the actions of the previous decision makers. This also allows for the analysis
studied earlier to be applicable and the value function at each time stage can be made to be
continuous under weak convergence.
Step (ii). With the new formulation, we show that the optimal cost function Jn(πn) is
continuous for every 1 ≤ n ≤ N . This follows through an inductive argument as follows.
For the last stageN , this follows by the continuity of the cost function in JN (πN , γ
N), as we
establish below.
The key step in the proof is to show that we have the desired continuity under the new
state and action space construction. In particular, let πN−1,m → πN−1 and (Qγ)Nm → (Qγ)
N
(where convergence is in the weak sense). With an abuse of notation, suppose that xN−1 also
contains uN−1 for the analysis below in Step (ii). Then, for every continuous and bounded
f , with∫
πN−1,m(dxN−1)Q(dy
N )γNm(du
N |yN)f(xN−1, y
N , uN ) =
∫
πN−1,m(dxN−1)h
m
N−1(xN−1)
with
hmN−1(x) :=
∫ (
Q(dyN)γNm(du
N |yN )f(x, yN , uN)
)
,
and
hN−1(x) :=
∫ (
Q(dyN)γN (duN |yN )f(x, yN , uN)
)
,
we show that hmN−1(xm) is a continuously converging function (as it is defined in [48]) in the
sense that for every xm → x,
hmN−1(xm)→ hN−1(x)
This follows from the following. First write
hmN−1(xm)− hN−1(x) =
(
hmN−1(xm)− hN−1(xm)
)
+
(
hN−1(xm)− hN−1(x)
)
The second term converges to zero by the dominated convergence theorem. The first term
converges to zero since(
hmN−1(xm)− hN−1(xm)
)
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=∫ (
Q(dyN)γNm(du
N |yN )−Q(dyN)γN (duN |yN )
)
f(xm, y
N , uN )
Here, (Qγ)Nm → (Qγ
N ) weakly and f(xm, y
N , uN)→ f(x, yN , uN ) continuously that
is, as a mapping from YN × UN → R, fm(yN , uN) := f(xm, yN , uN ) → f(yN , uN) :=
f(x, yN , uN) as m → ∞. Thus, the convergence holds by a generalized convergence theo-
rem given in [48, Theorem 3.5] or [35, Theorem 3.5].
Thus, continuity of JN (πN , γ
N) in (πN , γ
N) holds.
Step (iii). Now that we have established the continuity of JN (πN , γ
N ), it follows that
by the compactness of ΓN (which is independent of the state of the system),
JN (πN ) := inf
γN∈ΓN
JN (πN , γ
N)
is continuous in πN . Furthermore, an optimal selection exists for γ
N through the measurable
selection condition given in Lemma 4.2.
Step (iv). In fact, this also implies that
JN−1(πN−1, γN−1) = E[JN (πN )|πN−1, γ
N−1],
is continuous in πN−1 and γ
N−1. This follows because, πN is a deterministic function of
πN−1, γ
N−1, and thus what is needed to be shown is that with πN = G(πN−1, γ
N−1)
∫ (
G(πN−1, γ
N−1)
)
(dxN )f(xN )
is continuous in πN−1, γ
N−1. Note that
πN (dxN−1, du
N−1, dyN ) = πN−1(dx¯N−1)(Qγ)
N−1(dyN−1, duN−1)QN (dyN ),
where we use the notation x¯N−1 = {ω0, y1, . . . , yN−2, u1, . . . , uN−2} as xN−1 \ yN−1.
Through a similar argument as in Step (ii), continuity can be established.
Step (v). By induction, J1(π0) can be established. Furthermore, the optimal cost is
continuous in π0.
We formally state the implication in Step (v) as a theorem.
THEOREM 4.6. Under the hypotheses of Theorem 4.5, the optimal team cost is continu-
ous in π0, the prior measure on (ω0, y
1).
5. Existence of Optimal Policies in Decentralized Stochastic Control and Compari-
son with the Literature.
5.1. New existence results in the most general form. In the following, we first present
the new existence results of the paper in the most general form. The first one follows from
the dynamic programming method presented earlier, and the second one builds on a strategic
measures approach.
THEOREM 5.1. Consider a static or a dynamic team that admits a reduced form with
cs (see (2.4)) continuous. Suppose further that U
i is σ−compact (that is, Ui = ∪nKn for
a countable collection of compact sets Kn) and without any loss, the control laws can be
restricted to those with E[φi(ui)] ≤ M for some lower semi-continuous φi : Ui → R+
which satisfies limn→∞ infui /∈Kn φ
i(ui) =∞. Then, an optimal team policy exists.
Proof. Here, the realized control action sets are not compact valued, but the control
policy space considered is still weakly compact due to the properties of φi and the fact that
for a continuous function g,
∫
ν(dx)g(x) is lower semi-continuous in ν. Thus, the marginals
18
on Ui will be tight. If the marginals are tight, then the collection of all measures with these
tight marginals are also tight (see e.g., [58, Proof of Thm. 2.4]).
First, Step (ii) of the proof of Theorem 4.5 satisfies the lower semi-continuity property
using the fact that the cost is non-negative valued and through a truncation argument and let-
ting the truncation variable go to infinity through a monotone convergence theorem (applied
to the right hand side, and the truncated function replaced with the limit on the left hand side
as a universal upper bound). That is, with (πkN , γ
N
k ) → (πN , γ
N), we have that for every
L ∈ R+
lim inf
k→∞
JN (π
k
N , γ
N
k )
= lim inf
k→∞
∫
πkN−1(dxN−1)Q(dy
N )γNk (du
N |yN)c(xN−1, y
N , uN)
≥ lim inf
k→∞
∫
πkN−1(dxN−1)Q(dy
N )γNk (du
N |yN)min(L, c(xN−1, y
N , uN))
=
∫
πN−1(dxN−1)Q(dy
N )γN (duN |yN)min(L, c(xN−1, y
N , uN)), (5.1)
where the last equality holds due to Step (ii) of the proof of Theorem 4.5. Since L is arbitrary,
lim inf
k→∞
JN ((π
k
N , γ
N
k ))
≥
∫
πN−1(dxN−1)Q(dy
N )γN(duN |yN )c(xN−1, y
N , uN), (5.2)
leading to the lower semi-continuity of JN (πN , γ
N).
Furthermore, steps similar to Step (iii) of the proof of Theorem 4.5 can be adjusted to
ensure that
JN (πN ) := inf
γN∈ΓN
JN (πN , γ
N)
is lower semi-continuous in πN . This follows from the fact that, for compact U, the function
S(x) := inf
u∈U
d(x, u),
is lower semi-continuous if d(x, u) is. The argument follows from the following. Let xn → x
and u∗n be an optimal action at xn, and u
∗ be optimal at x. Then
lim inf
n→∞
d(xn, u
∗
n)− d(x, u
∗) ≥ 0
for otherwise if
lim inf
n→∞
d(xn, u
∗
n)− d(x, u
∗) < 0
there exists a subsequence and δ > 0 such that
lim inf
nk→∞
d(xnk , u
∗
nk
)− d(x, u∗) < −δ
But since d is lower semi-continuous, the above implies that for some further subsequence
along which u∗n′
k
→ v∗ for some v∗
d( lim
n′
k
→∞
xn′
k
, u∗n′
k
)− d(x, u∗) ≤ lim inf
nk→∞
d(xn′
k
, u∗n′
k
)− d(x, u∗) < −δ
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But, d(limn′
k
→∞ xn′
k
, u∗n′
k
) = d(x, v∗) cannot be less than d(x, u∗) − δ since u∗ is opti-
mal. Thus, at each step of the induction, the lower semi-continuity of the value function is
presented. Since in the proof of Theorem 4.5, πn → π and γin → γ
i satisfy the identical
conditions of lower semi-continuity and compactness, the result follows.
Furthermore, an optimal selection exists for γN through the measurable selection condi-
tions [29, Theorem 2], [46] [33].
Since JN (πN ) is lower semi-continuous, Step (iv) of the proof of Theorem 4.5 iden-
tically ensures that JN−1(πN−1, γ
N−1) is also lower semi-continuous. The recursion then
applies until t = 0.
We next present a strategic measures based approach. In the following, we show that
existence can be established even if the continuity is only in the actions (and not necessarily
in the measurement variables). This applies both for static teams, or the static reduction of
dynamics teams, with independent measurements.
THEOREM 5.2. Consider a static or a dynamic team that admits a reduced form with cs
(see (2.4)) continuous only in u for every fixed ω0,y. Suppose further that U
i is σ−compact
(that is, Ui = ∪nKn for a countable collection of compact setsKn) and without any loss, the
control laws can be restricted to those with E[φi(ui)] ≤ M for some lower semi-continuous
φi : Ui → R+ which satisfies limn→∞ infui /∈Kn φ
i(ui) = ∞. Then, an optimal team policy
exists.
Proof. Consider the product measure:
P (dω0)
N∏
k=1
(Qkγk)(dyk, duk).
Suppose that every action γˆk, that is, (Qkγk)m(dy
k, duk), converges to (Qkγk)(dyk, duk)
weakly. By [39, p. 57], the joint product measure P (dω0)
∏N
k=1(Q
kγk)m(dy
k, duk) will
converge weakly to P (dω0)
∏N
k=1(Q
kγk)(dyk, duk); see also [48, Section 5]. Recall the
w-s topology introduced by Scha¨l [47]: The w-s topology on the set of probability measures
P(X × U) is the coarsest topology under which
∫
f(x, u)ν(dx, du) : P(X × U) → R is
continuous for every measurable and bounded f which is continuous in u for every x (but
unlike weak topology, f does not need to be continuous in x). Since the marginals on
∏
k Y
k
is fixed, [47, Theorem 3.10] (or [5, Theorem 2.5]) establishes that the set of all probability
measures with a fixed marginal on
∏
k Y
k is relatively compact under the w-s topology. This
in turn ensures that the function (by a truncation and then a limiting argument as done earlier)
∫
P (dω0)
N∏
k=1
(Qkγk)(dyk, duk)c(ω0,u),
is lower semi-continuous under the w-s topology. Since the set of admissible strategic mea-
sures is sequentially compact under the w-s topology, existence of an optimal team policy
follows. The proof for dynamic case follows analogously.
REMARK 2. Building on [61, Theorems 2.3 and 2.5] and [26, p. 1691] (due to Black-
well’s irrelevant information theorem [9, 11], [59, p. 457]), an optimal policy, when exists,
can be assumed to be deterministic.
5.2. Comparison with the previously reported existence results and a refinement.
Existence of optimal policies for static and a class of sequential dynamic teams have been
studied recently in [26, 61]. More specific setups have been studied in [55], [52], [60] and
[59]. Existence of optimal team policies has been established in [17] for a class of continuous-
time decentralized stochastic control problems. For a class of teams which are convex, one
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can reduce the search space to a smaller parametric class of policies, such as linear policies
for quasi-classical linear quadratic Gaussian problems [41, 32, 30].
THEOREM 5.3. [61] (i) Consider a static or dynamic team. Let the loss function c
be lower semi-continuous in (ω0,u) and LR(µ) be a compact subset under weak topology.
Then, there exists an optimal team policy. This policy is deterministic and hence induces a
strategic measure in LA(µ).
(ii) Consider a static team or the static reduction of a dynamic team with c denoting the loss
function. Let c be lower semi-continuous in ω0,u and LC(µ) be a compact subset under
weak topology. Then, there exists an optimal team policy. This policy is deterministic and
hence induces a strategic measure in LA(µ).
However, we recall that unless certain conditions are imposed, the conditional indepen-
dence property is not preserved under weak or setwise convergence and thus LR(µ) is in
general not compact; see [61, Theorem 2.7].
We refer the reader to [6], and the references therein, for further related results on such
intricacies on conditional independence properties. A sufficient condition for compactness of
LR under the weak convergence topology was reported in [26]; we re-state this result in a
brief and different form below for reader’s convenience:
THEOREM 5.4. [26] Consider a static team where the action sets Ui, i ∈ N are com-
pact. Furthermore, if the measurements satisfy
P (dy|ω0) =
n∏
i=1
Qi(dyi|ω0),
where Qi(dyi|ω0) = η
i(yi, ω0)ν
i(dyi) for some positive measure νi and continuous ηi so
that for every ǫ > 0, there exists δ > 0 so that for ρi(a, b) < δ (where ρi is a metric on Y
i)
|ηi(b, ω0)− η
i(a, ω0)| ≤ ǫh
i(a, ω0),
with supω0
∫
hi(a, ω0)ν
i(dyi) <∞, then the set LR(µ) is weakly compact and if c(ω0,u) is
lower semi-continuous, there exists an optimal team policy (which is deterministic and hence
in LA(µ)).
The results in [26] also apply to static reductions for sequential dynamic teams, and a
class of teams with unbounded cost functions and non-compact action spaces that however
satisfies some moment-type cost functions leading to a tightness condition on the set of strate-
gic measures leading to a finite cost. In particular, the existence result applies to the celebrated
counterexample of Witsenhausen [52].
Theorems 4.5 and 5.1 provide weaker conditions when compared with Theorem 5.4.
For a class of sequential teams with perfect recall, we established the existence of optimal
team policies through Theorem 2.2 in [61]. Note that the cost function is given by c(ω0,u),
where ω0 is an exogenous random variable.
THEOREM 5.5. [61, Theorem 2.9] Consider a sequential team with a classical in-
formation structure with the further property that σ(ω0) ⊂ σ(y1). Suppose further that∏
k(Y
k × Uk) is compact. If c is lower semi-continuous and each of the kernels pn (defined
in (2.5)) is weakly continuous so that
∫
f(yn)pn(dy
n|ω0, y
1, . . . , yn−1, u1, · · · , un−1) (5.3)
is continuous in ω0, u
1, · · · , un−1 for every continuous and bounded f , there exists an opti-
mal team policy which is deterministic.
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A further existence result along similar lines, for a class of static teams, is presented
next. This result refines [61, Theorem 3.5], by relaxing the weak continuity condition there
on the kernel (i.e., the condition that
∫
f(yn)P (dyn|yn−1) is continuous in yn−1 for every
continuous and bounded f ).
THEOREM 5.6. Consider a static team with a classical information structure (that is,
with an expanding information structure so that σ(yn) ⊂ σ(yn+1), n ≥ 1). Suppose further
that
∏
k(Y
k × Uk) is compact. If
c˜(y1, · · · , yN , u1, · · · , uN ) := E[c(ω0,u)|y,u]
is jointly lower semi-continuous in u for every y, there exists an optimal team policy which
is deterministic.
Proof. Different from Theorem 5.5, we eliminate the use of ω0, and study the properties
of the set of strategic measures. Different from [61, Theorem 3.5], we relax weak continuity.
Once again, instead of the weak topology, we will use the w-s topology [46].
As in the proof of Theorem 5.5, when
∏
k Y
k × Uk is compact, the set of all probability
measures on
∏
k Y
k×Uk forms a weakly compact set. Since the marginals on
∏
k Y
k is fixed,
[46, Theorem 3.10] (or [5, Theorem 2.5]) establishes that the set of all probability measures
with a fixed marginal on
∏
k Y
k is relatively compact under the w-s topology. Therefore, it
suffices to ensure the closedness of the set of strategic measures, which leads to the sequen-
tial compactness of the set under this topology. To facilitate such a compactness condition, as
earlier we first expand the information structure so that DM k has access to all the previous
actions u1, · · · , uk−1 as well. Later on, we will see that this expansion is redundant. With this
expansion, any w-s converging sequence of strategic measures will continue satisfying (2.8)
in the limit due to the fact that there is no conditional independence property in the sequence
since all the information is available at DM k. That is, Pn(du
n|yn, y[0,n−1], u[0,n−1]) satis-
fies the conditional independence property trivially as all the information is available. On the
other hand, for each element in the sequence of conditional probability measures, the condi-
tional probability for the measurements writes as P (dyn|y[0,n−1], u[0,n−1]) = P (dy
n|yn−1).
We wish to show that this also holds for the w-s limit measure. Now, we have that for every
n, yn ↔ yn−1 ↔ hn−1 forms a Markov chain. By considering the convergence properties
only on continuous functions and bounded f , as in (2.7), with Pm → P weakly, we have that
∫
P (dyn|yn−1)Pm(dhn−1)f(y
n, hn−1) =
∫ (
P (dyn|yn−1)f(yn, hn−1)
)
Pm(dhn−1)
→
∫ (
P (dyn|yn−1)f(yn, hn−1)
)
P (dhn−1) =
∫
P (dyn|yn−1)P (dhn−1)f(y
n, hn−1)(5.4
Here,
(
P (dyn|yn−1)f(yn, hn−1)
)
is not continuous in yn−1, but it is in hn−2 and u
n−1 by
an application of the dominated convergence theorem, and since
Pm(dy
1, . . . , dyn−1, du1, . . . , dun−1)→ P (dy1, . . . , dyn−1, du1, . . . , dun−1),
in thew-s sense (setwise in the measurement variable coordinates), convergence holds. Thus,
(2.7) is also preserved. Hence, for any w-s converging sequence of strategic measures sat-
isfying (2.7)-(2.8) so does the limit since the team is static and with perfect-recall. By [46,
Theorem 3.7], and the generalization of Portmanteau theorem for the w-s topology, the lower
semi-continuity of
∫
µ(dy, du)c˜(y,u) over the set of strategic measures leads to the exis-
tence of an optimal strategic measure. As a result, the existence follows from similar steps
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to that of Theorem 5.3. Now, we know that an optimal policy will be deterministic (see Re-
mark 2). Thus, a deterministic policy may not make use of randomization, therefore DM k
having access to {yk, yk−1, yk−2, · · · } is informationally equivalent to him having access to
{yk, (yk−1, uk−1), (yk−2, uk−2)} for an optimal policy. Thus, an optimal team policy exists.
5.3. Discussion. We can thus report that Theorem 5.2 (for static teams or dynamic
teams with an independent-measurements reduction) and Theorems 5.5 and 5.6 (for sequen-
tial teams that do not allow an independent-measurements reduction) are the most general
existence results, to our knowledge, for sequential team problems considered in this paper.
These results complement each other and cover a very large class of decentralized stochastic
control problems.
Recently, Saldi [44] presented an alternative proof approach for the existence problem
and arrived at complementary existence results through constructing a new topology on the
space of team policies; the condition presented in [44] is implied by Theorem 5.2.
5.4. Applications.
5.4.1. Witsenhausen’s counterexample with Gaussian variables. Consider the cel-
ebrated Witsenhausen’s counterexample [52] as depicted in Figures 4.1 and 4.2: This is a
dynamic non-classical team problem with y1 and w1 zero-mean independent Gaussian ran-
dom variables with unit variance and u1 = γ1(y1), u2 = γ2(u1 + w1) and the cost function
c(ω, u1, u2) = k(y1 − u1)2 + (u1 − u2)2 for some k > 0. Witsenhausen’s counterexam-
ple can be expressed, through a change of measure argument (also due to Witsenhausen) as
follows. The static reduction proceeds as follows:
∫
(k(u1 − y1)2 + (u1 − u2)2)Q(dy1)γ1(du1|y1)γ2(du2|y2)P (dy2|u1)
=
∫
(k(u1 − y1)2 + (u1 − u2)2)Q(dy1)γ1(du1|y1)γ2(du2|y2)η(y2 − u1)dy2
=
∫ (
(k(u1 − y1)2 + (u1 − u2)2)γ1(du1|y1)γ2(du2|y2)
η(y2 − u1)
η(y2)
)
Q(dy1)η(y2)dy2
=
∫ (
(k(u1 − y1)2 + (u1 − u2)2)γ1(du1|y1)γ2(du2|y2)
η(y2 − u1)
η(y2)
)
Q(dy1)Q(dy2)
where Q denotes a Gaussian measure with zero mean and unit variance and η its density.
Since the optimal policy for γ2(y2) = E[u1|y1] andE[(E[u1|y1])2] ≤ E[(u1)2], it is evident
with a two-stage analysis (see [26, p. 1701]) that without any loss we can restrict the policies
to be so that E[(ui)2] ≤M for some finiteM , for i = 1, 2; this ensures a weak compactness
condition on both γˆ1 and γˆ2. Since the reduced cost
(
(k(u1− y1)2+(u1−u2)2)η(y
2−u1)
η(y2)
)
is continuous in the actions, Theorem 5.1 applies.
5.4.2. Existence for partially observable Markov Decision Processes (POMDPs).
Consider a partially observable stochastic control problem (POMDP) with the following dy-
namics.
xt+1 = f(xt, ut, wt), yt = g(xt, vt).
Here, xt is the X-valued state, ut is the U-valued the control, yt is the Y-valued measurement
process. In this section, we will assume that these spaces are finite dimensional real vector
spaces. Furthermore, (wt, vt) are i.i.d noise processes and {wt} is independent of {vt}. The
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controller only has causal access to {yt}: A deterministic admissible control policy Π is a
sequence of functions {γt} so that ut = γ(y[0,t];u[0,t−1]). The goal is to minimize
EΠx0 [
T−1∑
t=0
c(xt, ut)],
for some continuous and bounded c : X× U→ R+.
Such a problem can be viewed as a decentralized stochastic control problem with in-
creasing information, that is, one with a a classical information structure.
Any POMDP can be reduced to a (completely observable) MDP [62], [42], whose states
are the posterior state distributions or beliefs of the observer. A standard approach for solving
such problems then is to reduce the partially observable model to a fully observable model
(also called the belief-MDP) by defining
πt(A) := P (xt ∈ A|y[0,t], u[0,t−1]), A ∈ B(X)
and observing that (πt, ut) is a controlled Markov chain where πt is P(X)-valued with P(X)
being the space of probability measures onX under the weak convergence topology. Through
such a reduction, existence results can be established by obtaining conditions which would
ensure that the controlled Markovian kernel for the belief-MDP is weakly continuous, that is
if
∫
F (πt+1)P (dπt+1|πt = π, ut = u) is jointly continuous (weakly) in π and u for every
continuous and bounded function F on P(X).
This was studied recently in [24, Theorem 3.7, Example 4.1] (see also [14] in a control-
free context). In the context of the example presented, if f(·, ·, w) is continuous and g has
the form: yt = g(xt) + vt, with g continuous and wt admitting a continuous density function
η, an existence result can be established building on the measurable selection criteria under
weak continuity [27, Theorem 3.3.5, Proposition D.5], provided that U is compact.
On the other hand, through Theorem 5.6, such an existence result can also be established
by obtaining a static reduction under the aforementioned conditions. Indeed, through (2.4),
with η denoting the density of wn, we have P (yn ∈ B|xn, vn) =
∫
B η(y − g(xn, vn))dy.
With η and g continuous and bounded, taking yn := yn, by writing xn+1 = f(xn, un, wn) =
f(f(xn−1, un−1, wn−1), un, wn), and iterating inductively to obtain
xn+1 = hn(x0,u[0,n−1],w[0,n−1]),
for some hn which is continuous in u[0,n−1] for every fixed x0,w[0,n−1], one obtains a re-
duced cost (2.4) that is a continuous function of the the control actions. Theorem 5.6 then
implies the existence of an optimal control policy.
5.4.3. Revisiting fully observable Markov Decision Processes with the construction
presented in the paper. Consider a fully observed Markov decision process where the goal
is to minimize
EΠx0 [
T−1∑
t=0
c(xt, ut)],
for some continuous and bounded c : X×U → R+. Suppose that the controller has access to
x[0,t], u[0,t−1] at time t. This system can always be viewed as a sequential team problem with
a classical information structure. Under the assumption that the transition kernel according
to the usual formulation, that is P (dx1|x0 = x, u0 = u) is weakly continuous (in the sense
discussed in the previous application above), it follows that the transition kernel according
to the formulation introduced in Section 3.2 is also weakly continuous by an application [48,
Theorem 3.5]. It follows that the condition in Lemma 4.4 holds when U is compact, and
hence the existence of an optimal policy follows.
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6. Conclusion. For sequential dynamic teams with standard Borel measurement and
control action spaces, we introduced a dynamic programming formulation, established its
well-posedness and provided new existence results. Our dynamic program builds on, but
significantly modifies, Witsenhausen’s standard form, and the formulation here through our
recent work [61] allows for a standard Borel controlled state dynamics. This leads to a well-
defined dynamic programming recursion for a very general class of sequential decentralized
stochastic control problems. In addition, refined existence results have been obtained for
optimal policies; these generalize prior results in the literature.
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